Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2297094
 


 



Financial Conflicts of Interest in Medicine


Joseph Engelberg


University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Rady School of Management

Christopher A. Parsons


University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Rady School of Management

Nathan Tefft


Bates College

January 26, 2014


Abstract:     
We use the geographic distance between a doctor’s office and drug company headquarters to instrument for the likelihood of pecuniary transfers, such as meals or speaking fees. Doctors tilt prescriptions in favor of the paying firm’s drugs, shifting away from both branded and generic substitutes. Larger transfers cause larger shifts in prescriptions. We explore two potential explanations: 1) information flow (or its perception), and 2) rent seeking. Payments increase prescriptions of branded drugs over generic equivalents, situations where information cannot play a large role. However, doctors residing in states known to be corrupt in other ways (e.g., electoral fraud) are much more sensitive to payments from the drug industry, as are male doctors.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 60

Keywords: physician payments, prescription behavior, Sunshine Act

JEL Classification: I10, I18

working papers series





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Date posted: July 23, 2013 ; Last revised: January 27, 2014

Suggested Citation

Engelberg, Joseph and Parsons, Christopher A. and Tefft, Nathan, Financial Conflicts of Interest in Medicine (January 26, 2014). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2297094 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2297094

Contact Information

Joseph Engelberg (Contact Author)
University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Rady School of Management ( email )
9500 Gilman Drive
Rady School of Management
La Jolla, CA 92093
United States
Christopher A. Parsons
University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Rady School of Management ( email )
9500 Gilman Drive
Mail Code 0502
La Jolla, CA 92093-0112
United States
Nathan Tefft
Bates College ( email )
Lewiston, ME 04240
United States
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