The Fiduciary Foundations of Federal Equal Protection
Boston University School of Law
Guy I. Seidman
Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliyah - Radzyner School of Law
Robert G. Natelson
The Independence Institute; Montana Policy Institute
July 26, 2013
Boston Univ. School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 13-32
In Bolling v. Sharpe, the Supreme Court invalidated school segregation in the District of Columbia by inferring a broad “federal equal protection” principle from the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. It is often assumed that this principle is inconsistent with the Constitution’s original meaning and with “originalist” interpretation.
This Article demonstrates, however, that a federal equal protection principle is not only consistent with the Constitution’s original meaning, but inherent in it. The Constitution was crafted as a fiduciary document of the kind that, under contemporaneous law, imposed on agents acting for more than one beneficiary – and on officials serving the general public – a well-established duty to serve all impartially. The Constitution, like other fiduciary instruments, imposes a standard of equal treatment from which lawmakers and officials cannot depart without reasonable cause. Although the Constitution’s original meaning does not precisely define the answers to all “equal protection” cases, and does not necessarily prescribe norms identical to those of existing equal protection jurisprudence, it clearly does prohibit racial discrimination of the kind at issue in Bolling.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 48
Keywords: Constitutional law, equal protection, fiduciary
JEL Classification: K19, K39, K40, K49working papers series
Date posted: July 28, 2013
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