Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=229958
 
 

Footnotes (197)



 


 



Antitrust Beyond Competition: Market Failures, Total Welfare, and the Challenge of Intra-Market Second-Best Tradeoffs


Peter J. Hammer


Wayne State University Law School



Abstract:     
Should antitrust law ever sanction the accumulation of market power or permit other restraints of trade if such conduct would increase social welfare? This is the challenge raised by intramarket second-best tradeoffs. In the presence of multiple market failures, it is conceivable that mergers or other restraints traditionally viewed as anti-competitive may be welfare-enhancing. A social planner, given the mandate of maximizing total welfare, would permit such restraints. Could an antitrust judge come to the same result under a defensible application (or extension) of existing legal doctrine? This question highlights the tensions between an antitrust policy dedicated to preserving "competition" and an antitrust policy dedicated to maximizing total welfare.

This Article argues (1) that antitrust law should recognize a defense for private acts that restrain "competition" under the traditional antitrust analysis but advance total welfare, (2) that courts are competent to administer this defense, and (3) that the framework of existing antitrust statutes permits courts to recognize this defense. I suggest that to rebut a finding of illegality based upon a traditional presumption of anticompetitive effects, defendants should have to establish (1) that the challenged conduct is responsive to an identifiable market failure; (2) that the conduct produces a net increase in total welfare (static efficiency); (3) that the conduct will not substantially impair subsequent efforts to address the underlying market failure (dynamic efficiency); and (4) that there is not a less restrictive course of action consistent with the antitrust laws that could achieve the same static efficiency gain. This defense presupposes a total welfare standard of analysis.

Part I examines the theory of intramarket second-best analysis and outlines the parameters of the proposed defense. Part II examines the technical viability of the affirmative defense. Part III explores whether second-best tradeoffs and the total welfare standard underlying them can be reconciled with contemporary understandings of antitrust law and the institutional role of the courts.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 77

JEL Classification: K21, L40

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: August 3, 2000  

Suggested Citation

Hammer, Peter J., Antitrust Beyond Competition: Market Failures, Total Welfare, and the Challenge of Intra-Market Second-Best Tradeoffs. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=229958 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.229958

Contact Information

Peter Joseph Hammer (Contact Author)
Wayne State University Law School ( email )
471 Palmer
Detroit, MI 48202
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 2,414
Downloads: 445
Download Rank: 33,799
Footnotes:  197

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.609 seconds