Producer Liability and Competition Policy When Firms are Bound by a Common Industry Reputation
Central European University (CEU) - Department of Economics
Washington and Lee University - Department of Economics; CESifo
A. Joseph Guse
Washington and Lee University - Williams School of Commerce, Economics, and Politics
November 18, 2013
We contrast the laissez-faire regime with the regime of strict producer liability, and draw the implications for competition policy, in a setting where oligopolistic firms cannot differentiate themselves from rivals but rather are bound by a common industry reputation for product safety. We show that, first, unlike in the traditional products liability model, firms' incentives to invest in precaution depend on market structure. Second, depending on the magnitude of expected damages awarded by the courts, laissez-faire can welfare-dominate strict producer liability. Third, the relationship between social welfare and industry size, and hence the role for competition policy, depends on the institutional regime governing the industry. Under some circumstances, restricting industry size is unambiguously welfare-enhancing.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 33
Keywords: products liability, industry reputation, oligopoly, industry size, competition policy
JEL Classification: K13, L13, D43working papers series
Date posted: July 29, 2013 ; Last revised: November 18, 2013
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