Horizontal Mergers with Synergies: Cash vs. Profit-Share Auctions
University of Bonn - The Bonn Graduate School of Economics
Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
Humboldt University of Berlin - Faculty of Economics; Korea University - College of Economics and Commerce
July 29, 2013
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 31, No. 5, 2013
We consider takeover bidding in a Cournot oligopoly when firms have private information concerning the synergy effect of merging with a takeover target and bidders can influence rivals' beliefs through their bids. We compare cash and profit-share auctions, first- and second-price, supplemented by entry fees. Since non-merged firms benefit from a merger if synergies are low, bidders are subject to a positive externality with positive probability; nevertheless, pooling does not occur. Unlike cash auctions, profit-share auctions are not revenue equivalent, and the second-price profit-share auction is more profitable than the other auctions.
Keywords: Horizontal mergers, Takeovers, Auctions, Externalities, Oligopoly
JEL Classification: G34, D44, H23, L13, D43
Date posted: July 29, 2013
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