Is There a Unitary Concept of Discrimination?
Patrick S. Shin
Suffolk University Law School
July 1, 2013
Deborah Hellman & Sophia Moreau, eds., "Philosophical Foundations of Discrimination Law" (Oxford University Press, 2013), Forthcoming
Suffolk University Law School Research Paper No. 13-27
Is it possible to develop an account of the concept of discrimination that ties together the disparate strands of its reach in a morally cohesive way? In particular, can the various kinds of action that are standardly denominated as legal discrimination be thought to raise a united set of moral concerns? This chapter explores some moral explanations of certain familiar features of the legal notion of discrimination, with a view to investigating whether or how various standard instances of legal discrimination might be regarded as encompassed by a unitary moral concept.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 33
Keywords: discrimination, discrimination theory, legal discrimination, moral discrimination, Title VII
Date posted: August 1, 2013
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