Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2303903
 


 



Is There a Unitary Concept of Discrimination?


Patrick S. Shin


Suffolk University Law School

July 1, 2013

Deborah Hellman & Sophia Moreau, eds., "Philosophical Foundations of Discrimination Law" (Oxford University Press, 2013), Forthcoming
Suffolk University Law School Research Paper No. 13-27

Abstract:     
Is it possible to develop an account of the concept of discrimination that ties together the disparate strands of its reach in a morally cohesive way? In particular, can the various kinds of action that are standardly denominated as legal discrimination be thought to raise a united set of moral concerns? This chapter explores some moral explanations of certain familiar features of the legal notion of discrimination, with a view to investigating whether or how various standard instances of legal discrimination might be regarded as encompassed by a unitary moral concept.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 33

Keywords: discrimination, discrimination theory, legal discrimination, moral discrimination, Title VII

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Date posted: August 1, 2013  

Suggested Citation

Shin, Patrick S., Is There a Unitary Concept of Discrimination? (July 1, 2013). Deborah Hellman & Sophia Moreau, eds., "Philosophical Foundations of Discrimination Law" (Oxford University Press, 2013), Forthcoming; Suffolk University Law School Research Paper No. 13-27. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2303903

Contact Information

Patrick S. Shin (Contact Author)
Suffolk University Law School ( email )
120 Tremont Street
Boston, MA 02108-4977
United States
617-573-8182 (Phone)
617-305-3090 (Fax)
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