Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2304419
 
 

Citations (2)



 


 



Two Concepts of Corruption


Dennis F. Thompson


Harvard University - Department of Government

August 1, 2013

Edmond J. Safra Working Papers, No. 16

Abstract:     
To combat institutional corruption, we need to distinguish it clearly from individual corruption. Individual corruption occurs when an institution or its officials receive a benefit that does not serve the institution and provides a service through relationships external to the institution under conditions that reveal a quid pro quo motive. Institutional corruption occurs when an institution or its officials receive a benefit that is directly useful to performing an institutional purpose, and systematically provides a service to the benefactor under conditions that tend to undermine procedures that support the primary purposes of the institution. Institutional corruption does not receive the attention it deserves partly because it is so closely (and often unavoidably) related to conduct that is part of the job of a responsible official, the perpetrators are often seen as (and are) respectable officials just trying to do their job, and the legal system and public opinion are more comfortable with condemning wrongdoing that has a corrupt motive. Yet institutional corruption, which is usually built into the routines and practices of organizations, is usually more damaging to the institution and society than individual corruption, which in advanced societies typically consists of isolated acts of misconduct with effects limited in time and scope.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 24

Keywords: Institutional Corruption

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: August 1, 2013  

Suggested Citation

Thompson, Dennis F., Two Concepts of Corruption (August 1, 2013). Edmond J. Safra Working Papers, No. 16. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2304419 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2304419

Contact Information

Dennis F. Thompson (Contact Author)
Harvard University - Department of Government ( email )
1737 Cambridge Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,598
Downloads: 412
Download Rank: 39,034
Citations:  2

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo8 in 0.500 seconds