The Economics of the Restatement and of the Common Law
Keith N. Hylton
William Fairfield Warren Distinguished Professor, Boston University; Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law
Boston Univ. School of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 13-34
Boston Univ. School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 13-34
The common law process appears to have checks and balances that prevent the self-interest of a particular embedded actor (judge or lawyer) from having a substantial distortive effect. The question that follows is whether the Restatement project is also immune, to the same extent as the common law, from the self-interested incentives of actors involved in its creation. I argue that the Restatement process is far more vulnerable to distortion from self-interest than is the common law process.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 21
Keywords: common law process, Restatement, rule of reason, common law efficiency, utilitarianism and common law, duty and negligence, strict liability, mutual combat
JEL Classification: K00, K13, K19, K39working papers series
Date posted: August 19, 2013
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