Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2307959
 


 



Systemic Harms and Shareholder Value


John Armour


University of Oxford - Faculty of Law; University of Oxford - Said Business School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Jeffrey N. Gordon


Columbia Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

July 11, 2014

The Journal of Legal Analysis, Volume 6, Issue 1, October, 2014
ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 222
Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 452

Abstract:     
The financial crisis has demonstrated serious flaws in the corporate governance of systemically important financial firms. In particular, the Shareholder Value norm, which has guided corporate governance reform for a generation, proves to be a faulty guide for managerial action in systemically important firms. This is not only because the failure of such firms will have spillovers that defy the cost-internalization of the tort system but also because these spillovers will harm their own majoritarian shareholders. The interests of diversified shareholders fundamentally diverge from the interests of managers and other controllers because the failure of a systemically important financial firm will produce losses throughout a diversified portfolio, not just own-firm losses. Among the consequences: the business judgment rule protection that makes sense for officers and directors of a non-financial firm leads to excessive risk-taking in a systemically important financial firm. To encourage appropriate modification of the Shareholder Value norm, we propose officer and director liability rules as a complement (and substitute) to the prescriptive rules that have emerged from the financial crisis.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 51

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Financial Crisis, Financial Institutions, Director Liability

JEL Classification: G21, G23, G28, G34, K22

Accepted Paper Series





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Date posted: August 9, 2013 ; Last revised: October 4, 2014

Suggested Citation

Armour, John and Gordon, Jeffrey N., Systemic Harms and Shareholder Value (July 11, 2014). The Journal of Legal Analysis, Volume 6, Issue 1, October, 2014; ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 222; Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 452. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2307959

Contact Information

John Armour
University of Oxford - Faculty of Law ( email )
Oriel College
Oxford, OX1 4EW
United Kingdom
+44 1865 286544 (Phone)
University of Oxford - Said Business School ( email )
Park End Street
Oxford, OX1 1HP
Great Britain
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Jeffrey N. Gordon (Contact Author)
Columbia Law School ( email )
435 West 116th Street
Ctr. for Law and Economic Studies
New York, NY 10027
United States
212-854-2316 (Phone)
212-854-7946 (Fax)
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
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