Exclusive Dealing: Before Bork, and Beyond
J. Mark Ramseyer
Harvard Law School
Eric Bennett Rasmusen
Indiana University Bloomington - Department of Business Economics & Public Policy
October 6, 2013
Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 13-29
Antitrust scholars have come to accept the basic ideas about exclusive dealing that Bork articulated in The Antitrust Paradox. Indeed, they have even extended his list of reasons why exclusive dealing can promote economic efficiency. Yet they have also taken up his challenge to explain how exclusive dealing could possibly cause harm, and have modelled a variety of special cases where it does. Some (albeit not all) of these are sufficiently plausible to be useful to prosecutors and judges.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 16
Keywords: Exclusionary conduct, exclusive-dealing, vertical restraints, anti-trust, Bork,The Antitrust Paradox
JEL Classification: K21Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: August 13, 2013 ; Last revised: November 1, 2013
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