Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2310100
 


 



Lock-Up Creep


Steven Davidoff Solomon


University of California, Berkeley - School of Law

Christina M. Sautter


Louisiana State University Paul M. Hebert Law Center

August 14, 2013

The Journal of Corporation Law, Vol. 38, No. 4, 2013

Abstract:     
In recent years, the number and type of merger agreement lock-ups have significantly increased, a phenomenon we term "lock-up creep". Not only have new lock-ups arisen, but the terms of these lock-ups have become ever-more negotiated, intricate and varied. This article analyzes the causes of lock-up creep and assesses lock-up creep’s effect on the takeover market. The article was prepared for and presented at The Journal of Corporation Law symposium: Ten Years After Omnicare: The Evolving Market for Deal Protection Devices held at The University of Iowa College of Law.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 51

Keywords: takeovers, Delaware, merger agreements, lock-ups, deal protection devices, termination fees

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Date posted: August 14, 2013 ; Last revised: April 16, 2014

Suggested Citation

Davidoff Solomon, Steven and Sautter, Christina M., Lock-Up Creep (August 14, 2013). The Journal of Corporation Law, Vol. 38, No. 4, 2013. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2310100

Contact Information

Steven M. Solomon (Contact Author)
University of California, Berkeley - School of Law ( email )
215 Boalt Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720-7200
United States
Christina M. Sautter
Louisiana State University Paul M. Hebert Law Center ( email )
330 Law Center Building
Baton Rouge, LA 70803
United States
225-578-1306 (Phone)
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