Steven Davidoff Solomon
University of California, Berkeley - School of Law; University of California, Berkeley - Berkeley Center for Law, Business and the Economy
Christina M. Sautter
Louisiana State University Paul M. Hebert Law Center
August 14, 2013
The Journal of Corporation Law, Vol. 38, No. 4, 2013
In recent years, the number and type of merger agreement lock-ups have significantly increased, a phenomenon we term "lock-up creep". Not only have new lock-ups arisen, but the terms of these lock-ups have become ever-more negotiated, intricate and varied. This article analyzes the causes of lock-up creep and assesses lock-up creep’s effect on the takeover market. The article was prepared for and presented at The Journal of Corporation Law symposium: Ten Years After Omnicare: The Evolving Market for Deal Protection Devices held at The University of Iowa College of Law.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 51
Keywords: takeovers, Delaware, merger agreements, lock-ups, deal protection devices, termination fees
Date posted: August 14, 2013 ; Last revised: April 16, 2014
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