Lock-Up Creep

The Journal of Corporation Law, Vol. 38, No. 4, 2013

51 Pages Posted: 14 Aug 2013 Last revised: 16 Apr 2014

See all articles by Steven Davidoff Solomon

Steven Davidoff Solomon

University of California, Berkeley - School of Law; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Christina M. Sautter

Southern Methodist University - Dedman School of Law

Date Written: August 14, 2013

Abstract

In recent years, the number and type of merger agreement lock-ups have significantly increased, a phenomenon we term "lock-up creep". Not only have new lock-ups arisen, but the terms of these lock-ups have become ever-more negotiated, intricate and varied. This article analyzes the causes of lock-up creep and assesses lock-up creep’s effect on the takeover market. The article was prepared for and presented at The Journal of Corporation Law symposium: Ten Years After Omnicare: The Evolving Market for Deal Protection Devices held at The University of Iowa College of Law.

Keywords: takeovers, Delaware, merger agreements, lock-ups, deal protection devices, termination fees

Suggested Citation

Davidoff Solomon, Steven and Sautter, Christina M., Lock-Up Creep (August 14, 2013). The Journal of Corporation Law, Vol. 38, No. 4, 2013, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2310100

Steven Davidoff Solomon (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley - School of Law ( email )

215 Law Building
Berkeley, CA 94720-7200
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Christina M. Sautter

Southern Methodist University - Dedman School of Law ( email )

P.O. Box 750116
Dallas, TX 75275
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.smu.edu/Law/Faculty/Profiles/Sautter-Christina

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