SSRN Home Search and Download Papers Browse Abstract and Paper Submission Subscribe to Networks View Briefcase Top Papers Top Authors Top Institutions

 

Abstract

 
 

Citations (8)

Beta

 
 

Footnotes (40)

Beta

 


 



The Core Institutions that Support Strong Securities Markets

Bernard S. Black
Northwestern University - School of Law; Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management; University of Texas at Austin - School of Law; McCombs School of Business, University of Texas at Austin; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)



As published in Business Lawyer, Vol. 55, pp. 1565-1607, 2000

Abstract:     
A strong securities markets rests on a complex network of supporting institutions that ensure that minority shareholders (i) receive good information about the value of a company's business, and (ii) can have confidence that a company's managers and controlling shareholders won't cheat them out of most or all of the value of their investment. A country whose laws and related institutions fail on either count cannot develop a strong stock market, forcing firms to rely on internal financing or bank financing - both of which have important shortcomings. This article explains why these two investor protection issues are critical, related, and hard to solve, and discusses which laws and institutions are most important for each.

This article is an earlier and shorter version of Bernard Black, "The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets," UCLA Law Review, vol. 48, pp. 781-855 (2001), which is available on SSRN at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=182169

JEL Classifications: G38, K22

Accepted Paper Series

Date posted: June 16, 2000 ; Last revised: January 20, 2003

Suggested Citation

Black, Bernard S., The Core Institutions that Support Strong Securities Markets (June 2000). As published in Business Lawyer, Vol. 55, pp. 1565-1607, 2000. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=231120 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.231120


Export to: Export Citation What's this?

Contact Information

Bernard S. Black (Contact Author)
Northwestern University - School of Law ( email )
375 E. Chicago Ave
Chicago, IL 60611
United States
512-503-2784 (Phone)

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )
2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States
847-491-5049 (Phone)
University of Texas at Austin - School of Law ( email )
Austin, TX 78705
United States
512-471-4632 (Phone)
McCombs School of Business, University of Texas at Austin
Austin, TX 78712
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Brussels Belgium
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 5,994
Downloads: 1,474
Download Rank: 2,735
Citations: 8
Footnotes: 40

© 2010 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was served by apolloc 6 in 1.265 seconds.