Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2311389
 


 



Making Impossible Tax Reform Possible


Susannah Camic Tahk


University of Wisconsin Law School

August 16, 2013

Fordham Law Review, Vol. 81, No. 5, 2013
Univ. of Wisconsin Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1232

Abstract:     
The United States has long struggled to reform its federal income tax code. Despite enthusiastic and widespread bipartisan support for tax reform laws that would eliminate special-interest loopholes, the legislative process has been paralyzed when it comes to passing these laws. This Article proposes a solution to this seemingly intractable federal tax lawmaking paralysis. This paralysis arises because tax reform spreads its benefits among broad groups while concentrating its costs on narrow ones. Political science theory accurately predicts that laws with this cost-benefit allocation will fail. However, federal lawmakers can overcome tax lawmaking paralysis by distributing tax reform's costs and benefits differently. In particular, the federal government can do this by following the examples of states that have successfully escaped tax lawmaking paralysis by earmarking taxes for specific purposes. This Article examines the phenomenon of earmarking and examines several instances of earmarked state taxes. In so doing, this Article argues that earmarking tax revenues for particular purposes offers an opportunity for lawmakers to permanently reform the tax code at last.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 47

Keywords: tax, tax policy, tax reform, earmarked taxes

Accepted Paper Series





Download This Paper

Date posted: August 18, 2013 ; Last revised: March 23, 2014

Suggested Citation

Tahk, Susannah Camic, Making Impossible Tax Reform Possible (August 16, 2013). Fordham Law Review, Vol. 81, No. 5, 2013; Univ. of Wisconsin Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1232. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2311389

Contact Information

Susannah Camic Tahk (Contact Author)
University of Wisconsin Law School ( email )
975 Bascom Mall
Madison, WI 53706
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 184
Downloads: 24
People who downloaded this paper also downloaded:
1. Public Choice Theory & Earmarked Taxes
By Susannah Tahk

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo2 in 0.265 seconds