Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=231186
 
 

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The Structure and Conduct of Corporate Lobbying: How Firms Lobby the Federal Communications Commission


John M. De Figueiredo


Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Emerson H. Tiller


Northwestern University - School of Law

June 2000

NBER Working Paper No. w7726

Abstract:     
lobbying (internal organization vs. trade association) by firms in administrative agencies. It explores the power and limitations of the collective action theories and transaction cost theories in explaining lobbying. It introduces a dataset of over 900 lobbying contacts cover 101 issues at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in early 1998. We find that the structure and conduct of large firm lobbying at the FCC is consistent with the predictions of theories of transaction costs and the main results of theories of collective action. However, large firms do not change their behavior drastically as structures arise to remedy the free rider problem. Small firms show no sensitivity to collective action issues or transaction cost issues in the organization or amount of their lobbying, but they do lobby less when having to reveal proprietary information. In sum, large firms behave largely consistent with theoretical predictions, while small firms do not.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 51

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Date posted: June 2, 2000  

Suggested Citation

de Figueiredo, John M. and Tiller, Emerson H., The Structure and Conduct of Corporate Lobbying: How Firms Lobby the Federal Communications Commission (June 2000). NBER Working Paper No. w7726. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=231186

Contact Information

John M. De Figueiredo (Contact Author)
Duke University ( email )
100 Fuqua Drive
Durham, NC 27708-0204
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Emerson H. Tiller
Northwestern University - School of Law ( email )
375 E. Chicago Ave
Unit 1505
Chicago, IL 60611
United States
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