Commercial Policy Variability, Bindings and Market Access
Joseph F. Francois
Johannes Kepler University Linz; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Vienna Institute of International Economic Studies (WIIW); University of Adelaide - School of Economics
World Bank - Policy Research Department
CIES Working Paper No. 7
Protection unconstrained by rules often varies substantially over time. Rules-based disciplines, like OECD industrial tariff bindings negotiated under GATT since 1947 and new Uruguay Round bindings on agricultural and services trade and on developing country industrial tariffs, constrain this variability. We examine the theoretical effects of such constraints on the expected cost of protection and offer a formalization of the concept of "market access," emphasizing both the first and second moments of the distribution of protection. As an illustration, we provide a stylized examination of Uruguay Round agricultural bindings.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 23
Keywords: Expected Costs of Protection, Commercial Policy Uncertainty, Market Access WTO, Tariff Bindings.
JEL Classification: F13working papers series
Date posted: August 3, 2000
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