Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2313343
 
 

References (96)



 


 



Do Kinship Networks Strengthen Private Property? Evidence from Rural China


Taisu Zhang


Duke University - School of Law; Yale University

Xiaoxue Zhao


Yale University - Department of Economics

February 8, 2014

12 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies (2015, Forthcoming)

Abstract:     
This paper finds that the existence of strong kinship networks tends to limit state interference with private property use in rural China by protecting villagers against unwanted government land takings. It then distinguishes kinship networks from other kinds of social networks by showing that their deterrence effect against coercive takings is far more significant and resilient under conditions of prevalent rural-urban migration than deterrence by neighborhood cooperatives and religious groups. Finally, the paper attempts to identify and differentiate between various possible mechanisms behind these effects: It argues that kinship networks protect private property usage mainly through encouraging social reciprocity between kinsmen, which facilitates collective action against coercive takings. Kinship networks are more effective than neighborhood cooperatives or religious groups at sustaining reciprocity over long distances and, therefore, are less affected by rural-urban migration. Altruism between kinsmen, however, does not emerge from the data as a major factor.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 40

Keywords: Property rights, land takings, kinship, social networks

JEL Classification: D70, K11, P26, P32

Accepted Paper Series


Download This Paper

Date posted: August 22, 2013 ; Last revised: April 4, 2014

Suggested Citation

Zhang, Taisu and Zhao, Xiaoxue, Do Kinship Networks Strengthen Private Property? Evidence from Rural China (February 8, 2014). 12 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies (2015, Forthcoming). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2313343 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2313343

Contact Information

Taisu Zhang (Contact Author)
Duke University - School of Law ( email )
Box 90360
Duke School of Law
Durham, NC 27708
United States
Yale University ( email )
New Haven, CT 06520
United States
Xiaoxue Zhao
Yale University - Department of Economics ( email )
28 Hillhouse Ave
New Haven, CT 06520-8268
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 383
Downloads: 154
Download Rank: 110,840
References:  96

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.281 seconds