Antitrust Enforcement and Sectoral Regulation: The Competition Policy Benefits of Concurrent Enforcement in the Communications Sector
Jonathan B. Baker
American University - Washington College of Law
August 20, 2013
Competition Policy International, Vol. 9, No. 1, Spring 2013
The US competition agencies – the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) – often share jurisdiction with sectoral regulators also charged with fostering competition, such as the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). This article highlights how this institutional structure – concurrent jurisdiction – helps protect competition through the lens of recent US experiences involving the communications industry. It argues that concurrent jurisdiction is likely most effective when the communications regulator has independent access to industry information to limit capture, when the communications regulator can take a long-term perspective, when the antitrust agency can focus on competition as its sole goal, and when senior appointments at the two agencies are made with coordination between them in mind.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 9
JEL Classification: K21, K23, L43
Date posted: August 22, 2013
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