A Solution to the Collective Action Problem in Corporate Reorganization
Eric A. Posner
University of Chicago - Law School
E. Glen Weyl
University of Chicago; University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics
September 5, 2013
University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 653
The voting rules in Chapter 11 are supposed to ensure that debtor firms are appropriately liquidated or reorganized. However, these convoluted and internally inconsistent rules are poorly designed to produce such outcomes, and there is no evidence that they do. However, the major proposals for reform, including auctions and options-trading, neglect the fundamentally collective nature of choices in reorganizations. We argue that a more appealing reform is the improvement of voting rules through the use of an economically efficient procedure known as quadratic voting, according to which stakeholders may cast a number of votes equal to the square root of the liquidation value of their claims. We discuss how quadratic voting could be implemented through reform of Chapter 11 and the advantages it would bring.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 26Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: September 8, 2013
© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.484 seconds