Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2321904
 


 



A Solution to the Collective Action Problem in Corporate Reorganization


Eric A. Posner


University of Chicago - Law School

E. Glen Weyl


Microsoft Research New England; University of Chicago

September 5, 2013

University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 653

Abstract:     
The voting rules in Chapter 11 are supposed to ensure that debtor firms are appropriately liquidated or reorganized. However, these convoluted and internally inconsistent rules are poorly designed to produce such outcomes, and there is no evidence that they do. However, the major proposals for reform, including auctions and options-trading, neglect the fundamentally collective nature of choices in reorganizations. We argue that a more appealing reform is the improvement of voting rules through the use of an economically efficient procedure known as quadratic voting, according to which stakeholders may cast a number of votes equal to the square root of the liquidation value of their claims. We discuss how quadratic voting could be implemented through reform of Chapter 11 and the advantages it would bring.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 26

Accepted Paper Series


Download This Paper

Date posted: September 8, 2013  

Suggested Citation

Posner, Eric A. and Weyl, E. Glen, A Solution to the Collective Action Problem in Corporate Reorganization (September 5, 2013). University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 653. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2321904

Contact Information

Eric A. Posner (Contact Author)
University of Chicago - Law School ( email )
1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-0425 (Phone)
773-702-0730 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/posner-e/
Eric Glen Weyl
Microsoft Research New England ( email )
One Memorial Drive, 14th Floor
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
(857) 998-4513 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.glenweyl.com
University of Chicago ( email )
1126 East 59th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
(773) 702-4862 (Phone)
(773) 702-8490 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.glenweyl.com
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 562
Downloads: 156
Download Rank: 111,257

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.390 seconds