Coalitional Bargaining and Duration in the EU Legislative Process

ECPR General Conference 201, Bordeaux, 4-7 September, 2013

42 Pages Posted: 11 Sep 2013 Last revised: 9 Aug 2015

Date Written: September 4, 2013

Abstract

The duration of the legislative process is one of the most important indicators of legislative productivity and gridlock. Focusing the Council of the European Union, we contend that endogenous coalition dynamics within the legislature largely determine efficiency in lawmaking. Our model of legislative bargaining suggests that governments in the Council adopt legislation when they can form a decisive majority coalition with like-minded governments. When a compromise can only be struck by a policy dispersed majority, however, governments have incentives to delay legislation in the expectation of opportunities for better deals in the future. We examine shifts in majority coalitions across all government compositions of the Council from 2002 to 2009. Consistent with our theoretical expectations, our event history analysis shows that the probability of a bill to be adopted considerable decreases when governments are only able to form policy heterogeneous coalitions. We find, however, that as the time spent in negotiations increases, opportunity costs become important and legislation is adopted quickly.

Keywords: Coalitions, cooperative game theory, survival model, Council EU, legislative process

Suggested Citation

Garcia Perez de Leon, Cesar and Grossman, Emiliano, Coalitional Bargaining and Duration in the EU Legislative Process (September 4, 2013). ECPR General Conference 201, Bordeaux, 4-7 September, 2013, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2324040 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2324040

Cesar Garcia Perez de Leon (Contact Author)

Sciences Po ( email )

27 Rue St. Guilllaume
Paris, 75007
France

HOME PAGE: http://www.cee.sciences-po.fr/

Emiliano Grossman

Sciences Po / CEE ( email )

27 rue Saint-Guillaume
Paris Cedex 07, 75007
France
+33 (1) 45 49 50 74 (Phone)

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