Endogenous Property Rights
Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management
Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management; NBER
University of Chicago - Irving B. Harris Graduate School of Public Policy Studies; Higher School of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
It is often argued that additional checks and balances provide economic agents with better protection from expropriation of their wealth or productive capital. We demonstrate that in a dynamic political economy model this intuition may be awed. Surprisingly, increasing the number of veto players or the majority requirement for redistribution may reduce property right protection on the equilibrium path. The reason is the existence of two distinct mechanisms of property rights protection. One are formal constraints that allow individuals or groups to block any redistribution which is not in their favor. The other occurs in equilibrium where agents without such powers protect each other from redistribution. Players without formal blocking power anticipate that the expropriation of other similar players will ultimately hurt them and thus combine their inuence to prevent redistributions. Yet, such incentives can be undermined by adding formal constraints. The ip-side of this e¤ect is that individual investment e¤orts might require coordination. The model also predicts that the distribution of wealth in societies with weaker formal institutions (smaller supermajority requirements) among players without veto power will tend to be more homogenous.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 35
Keywords: political economy, legislative bargaining, property rights, institutions
JEL Classification: D71, D74, C71
Date posted: September 18, 2013 ; Last revised: July 15, 2014
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