Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2327903
 


 



Stabilizing Low-Wage Work: Legal Remedies for Unpredictable Work Hours and Income Instability


Charlotte Alexander


Georgia State University College of Law; Georgia State University - Risk Management & Insurance Department

Anna Haley-Lock


University of Wisconsin-Madison

Nantiya Ruan


University of Denver Sturm College of Law

March 25, 2014

Harvard Civil Rights- Civil Liberties Law Review (CR-CL), Forthcoming
U Denver Legal Studies Research Paper No. 13-43

Abstract:     
Low-wage, hourly-paid service workers are increasingly subject to employers’ “just-in-time” scheduling practices. In a just-in-time model, employers give workers little advance notice of their schedules, call workers in to work during non-scheduled times to meet unexpected customer demand, and send workers home early when business is slow. The federal Fair Labor Standards Act, the main guarantor of workers’ wage and hour rights, provides no remedy for the unpredictable work hours and income instability caused by employers’ last minute call-in and send-home practices. This Article examines two alternative sources of legal protection that have received little attention in the literature on low-wage work: provisions in unionized workers’ collective bargaining agreements that guarantee a minimum number of hours of pay when workers are called in to or sent home from work unexpectedly, and state laws that contain similar guaranteed pay provisions. The Article concludes by assessing these tools’ effectiveness in reducing work hour fluctuations and income instability in low-wage, hourly service jobs.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 57

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Date posted: January 9, 2014 ; Last revised: March 26, 2014

Suggested Citation

Alexander, Charlotte and Haley-Lock, Anna and Ruan, Nantiya, Stabilizing Low-Wage Work: Legal Remedies for Unpredictable Work Hours and Income Instability (March 25, 2014). Harvard Civil Rights- Civil Liberties Law Review (CR-CL), Forthcoming; U Denver Legal Studies Research Paper No. 13-43. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2327903 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2327903

Contact Information

Charlotte Alexander
Georgia State University College of Law ( email )
P.O. Box 4037
Atlanta, GA 30302-4037
United States
Georgia State University - Risk Management & Insurance Department ( email )
P.O. Box 4036
Atlanta, GA 30302-4036
United States
Anna Haley-Lock
University of Wisconsin-Madison ( email )
United States
608-262-5766 (Phone)
Nantiya Ruan (Contact Author)
University of Denver Sturm College of Law ( email )
2255 E. Evans Avenue
Denver, CO 80208
United States
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