Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2328427
 


 



Merger Policy at the Margin: Western Refining's Acquisition of Giant Industries


Nicholas Kreisle


U.S. Federal Trade Commission - Bureau of Economics

September 19, 2013

U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics, Working Paper No. 319

Abstract:     
In May 2007 the Federal Trade Commission failed to win a preliminary injunction in U.S. District Court that would have blocked the merger of two refiners that served Albuquerque, NM and surrounding areas. This study compares estimates of the post-merger price effect to the price effects predicted by economic experts on both sides of the case. I find little scope to interpret the evidence as consistent with an anticompetitive post-merger price effect. I also highlight difficulties involved in econometrically identifying small effects even with an abundance of pricing data.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 22

Keywords: Merger Retrospectives, Petroleum Industry

JEL Classification: L10, L41, L71

Accepted Paper Series


Download This Paper

Date posted: September 21, 2013 ; Last revised: September 25, 2013

Suggested Citation

Kreisle, Nicholas, Merger Policy at the Margin: Western Refining's Acquisition of Giant Industries (September 19, 2013). U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics, Working Paper No. 319. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2328427

Contact Information

Nicholas Kreisle (Contact Author)
U.S. Federal Trade Commission - Bureau of Economics ( email )
601 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20580
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 187
Downloads: 42

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.281 seconds