Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2329996
 


 



Unconstrained Deference, Chenery, and FOIA


Margaret B. Kwoka


University of Denver Sturm College of Law

August 22, 2013

Maryland Law Review, Forthcoming
U Denver Legal Studies Research Paper No. 13-45

Abstract:     
Litigation fails adequately to check agency secrecy decisions under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). To vindicate the public’s right to know what its government is up to, the dynamic of FOIA litigation needs fundamental change. This Article builds on previous work documenting that courts routinely defer to agency decisions to withhold records from the public, despite Congress’s clear mandate for de novo judicial review. In this Article, a paradox is revealed: while courts do not effectuate true de novo review, they rely on that statutory standard to allow agencies to raise claims of exemption in litigation not relied on in the agency’s response to a request for information. As a result, requesters end up in a worse position under de novo review than they would have been if Congress had chosen deferential review in FOIA cases. Given existing practice, FOIA’s goal of transparency would be best served by relocating FOIA within a more typical administrative law paradigm. Chiefly, it contends that the observed deference justifies applying the Chenery principle to FOIA litigation, which would preclude agencies from asserting exemption claims for the first time in litigation. This Article demonstrates that not only can the application of Chenery be justified doctrinally and theoretically, but also that the benefits of constraining agency litigation positions outweigh potential costs, rendering FOIA litigation a more fundamentally fair process that better advances government transparency.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 59

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Date posted: September 25, 2013  

Suggested Citation

Kwoka, Margaret B., Unconstrained Deference, Chenery, and FOIA (August 22, 2013). Maryland Law Review, Forthcoming; U Denver Legal Studies Research Paper No. 13-45. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2329996

Contact Information

Margaret B. Kwoka (Contact Author)
University of Denver Sturm College of Law ( email )
2255 E. Evans Avenue
Denver, CO 80208
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.du.edu/index.php/profile/margaret-kwoka
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