Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2330914
 


 



Injunctions in Sovereign Debt Litigation


Mark C. Weidemaier


University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - School of Law

Anna Gelpern


Georgetown University Law Center

November 15, 2013

Yale Journal on Regulation, 2014, Forthcoming
UNC Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2330914

Abstract:     
Injunctions against foreign sovereigns have come under criticism on comity and enforcement grounds. We argue that these objections are overstated. Comity considerations are important but not dispositive. Enforcement objections assign too much significance to the court’s inability to impose meaningful contempt sanctions, overlooking the fact that, when a foreign sovereign is involved, both money judgments and injunctions are enforced through what amounts to a court-imposed embargo. This embargo discourages third parties from dealing with the sovereign and, if sufficiently costly, can induce the sovereign to comply. Nevertheless, we are skeptical about injunctions in sovereign debt litigation. They are prone to dramatic spillover effects precisely because they cannot reach their primary target, the sovereign government. Recent decisions in NML v. Argentina illustrate the way in which a court’s inability to compel compliance by the sovereign may lead it to impose dramatic and potentially unwarranted costs on third parties, turning traditional equitable analysis on its head.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 40

Keywords: sovereign debt, sovereign immunity, injunctions, Argentina

JEL Classification: F34, K41

Accepted Paper Series


Download This Paper

Date posted: September 27, 2013 ; Last revised: November 16, 2013

Suggested Citation

Weidemaier, Mark C. and Gelpern, Anna, Injunctions in Sovereign Debt Litigation (November 15, 2013). Yale Journal on Regulation, 2014, Forthcoming; UNC Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2330914. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2330914

Contact Information

Mark C. Weidemaier (Contact Author)
University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - School of Law ( email )
Van Hecke-Wettach Hall, 160 Ridge Road
CB #3380
Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3380
United States
919.843.4373 (Phone)

Anna Gelpern
Georgetown University Law Center ( email )
600 New Jersey Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 397
Downloads: 118
Download Rank: 134,104

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.516 seconds