Is New Governance the Ideal Architecture for Global Financial Regulation?

Monetary and Economic Studies v.31 (November 2013)

Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper No. 14-03

45 Pages Posted: 4 Oct 2013 Last revised: 23 Dec 2013

Date Written: August 1, 2013

Abstract

A central challenge for international financial regulatory systems today is how to manage the impact of global systemically important financial institutions (G-SIFIs) on the global economy, given the interconnected and pluralistic nature of regulatory regimes. This paper focuses on the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and proposes a new research agenda for the FSB's emerging regulatory forms. In particular, it examines the regulatory architecture of the New Governance (NG), a variety of approaches that are supposed to be more reflexive, collaborative, and experimental than traditional forms of governance. A preliminary conclusion is that NG tools may be effective in resolving some kinds of problems in a pluralistic regulatory order, but they are unlikely to be suitable for all problems. As such, this article proposes that analyses of the precise conditions in which NG mechanisms may or may not be effective are necessary. It concludes with some recommendations for improving the NG model.

Keywords: International financial regulation; Global systemically important financial institutions; Financial Stability Board; Regulatory reform; New Governance; Regulatory pluralism

Suggested Citation

Riles, Annelise and Riles, Annelise, Is New Governance the Ideal Architecture for Global Financial Regulation? (August 1, 2013). Monetary and Economic Studies v.31 (November 2013), Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper No. 14-03, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2334343

Annelise Riles (Contact Author)

Buffett Institute of Global Affairs ( email )

1902 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL
United States

Northwestern Law School ( email )

375 E. Chicago Ave
Chicago, IL 60611
United States
(312) 503-1018 (Phone)
(312) 988-6579 (Fax)

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