Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2334454
 


 



Disclosure and Corruption


Michael D. Gilbert


University of Virginia School of Law

Benjamin Aiken


University of Virginia - School of Law, Degree Candidate Author

August 11, 2014

Election Law Journal (Forthcoming)
Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 2013-37
Virginia Law and Economics Research Paper No. 2013-10

Abstract:     
Disclosure laws require individuals and organizations that spend money on political speech to make public their identities. The Supreme Court and many others laud disclosure for shining light on money in politics and combating quid pro quo corruption. But that support may be misplaced. While disclosure provides information to law enforcement and the general public, it also provides information to corrupt actors. Disclosure records can tell politicians which private actors support compliant candidates, and the records can help private actors determine which politicians reward their benefactors. Disclosure can thus bring conspirators together and reduce the uncertainty that inheres in illegal transactions. That means disclosure has cross-cutting effects. It can deter corruption by increasing the likelihood of exposure, but it can also raise the benefit of corruption by increasing the certainty that parties to corrupt deals will keep their promises. When the second effect trumps, disclosure increases corruption. This analysis has implications for scholarship and law. It suggests that policymakers and judges should be less optimistic about disclosure and open to alternative corruption-fighting measures.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 45

Keywords: Election Law, Campaign Finance, Disclosure, Corruption

Accepted Paper Series


Download This Paper

Date posted: October 2, 2013 ; Last revised: August 23, 2014

Suggested Citation

Gilbert, Michael D. and Aiken, Benjamin, Disclosure and Corruption (August 11, 2014). Virginia Law and Economics Research Paper No. 2013-10; Election Law Journal (Forthcoming); Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 2013-37; Virginia Law and Economics Research Paper No. 2013-10. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2334454

Contact Information

Michael Gilbert (Contact Author)
University of Virginia School of Law ( email )
580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903
United States

Benjamin Aiken
University of Virginia - School of Law, Degree Candidate Author ( email )
580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 767
Downloads: 181
Download Rank: 97,075
People who downloaded this paper also downloaded:
1. Campaign Finance Disclosure and the Information Tradeoff
By Michael Gilbert

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.343 seconds