Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2334738
 


 



Tacit Coordination in Games with Third-Party Externalities


James R. Bland


Purdue University - Department of Economics

Nikos Nikiforakis


New York University (NYU) - New York University Abu Dhabi

October 2013

MPI Collective Goods Preprint, No. 2013/19

Abstract:     
When agents face coordination problems their choices often impose externalities on third parties. We investigate whether such externalities can affect equilibrium selection in a series of one-shot coordination games varying the size and the sign of the externality. We find that third-party externalities have a limited effect on decisions. A large majority of participants in the experiment are willing to take an action that increases their income slightly, even if doing so causes substantial inequalities and reductions in overall efficiency. Individuals revealed to be other-regarding in a non-strategic allocation task often behave as-if selfish when trying to coordinate.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 57

Keywords: social preferences, efficiency, externalities, tacit coordination, equilibrium selection

JEL Classification: D63, D01, D62, C90, D03

working papers series


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Date posted: October 3, 2013  

Suggested Citation

Bland, James R. and Nikiforakis, Nikos, Tacit Coordination in Games with Third-Party Externalities (October 2013). MPI Collective Goods Preprint, No. 2013/19. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2334738 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2334738

Contact Information

James R. Bland
Purdue University - Department of Economics ( email )
West Lafayette, IN 47907-1310
United States
HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/jamesbland/home
Nikos Nikiforakis (Contact Author)
New York University (NYU) - New York University Abu Dhabi ( email )
PO Box 129188
Abu Dhabi
United Arab Emirates
HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/nnikiforakis/home
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