Tacit Coordination in Games with Third-Party Externalities
James R. Bland
Purdue University - Department of Economics
New York University (NYU) - New York University Abu Dhabi
MPI Collective Goods Preprint, No. 2013/19
When agents face coordination problems their choices often impose externalities on third parties. We investigate whether such externalities can affect equilibrium selection in a series of one-shot coordination games varying the size and the sign of the externality. We find that third-party externalities have a limited effect on decisions. A large majority of participants in the experiment are willing to take an action that increases their income slightly, even if doing so causes substantial inequalities and reductions in overall efficiency. Individuals revealed to be other-regarding in a non-strategic allocation task often behave as-if selfish when trying to coordinate.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 57
Keywords: social preferences, efficiency, externalities, tacit coordination, equilibrium selection
JEL Classification: D63, D01, D62, C90, D03working papers series
Date posted: October 3, 2013
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