Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2335651
 


 



Antitrust Enforcement and Regulation. Different Standards but Incentive Coherent?


Alberto Heimler


Government of the Italian Republic (Italy) - National School of Administration

October 3, 2013


Abstract:     
Governments play a significant role in determining how markets function and use a variety of policies for this purpose, including economic regulation, trade policy and antitrust. Some of these policies (i.e. trade policy and antitrust) in principle promote competition directly, but sometimes are too intrusive, while others pursue other general interest objectives and in so doing restrict competition, sometimes beyond what is strictly necessary. While in the last few decades antitrust scholars and practitioners have thoroughly emphasized the role of incentives in achieving optimal economic outcomes, even though actual antitrust enforcement has not always been coherent in this respect, such an understanding does not play a similar role in other policy domains. This paper, by discussing selective, but relevant examples, shows how economic regulation, trade policy, intellectual property and antitrust laws have been applied in recent years without considering the compatibility with proper incentive schemes. Some policy changes and legislation reforms are discussed and suggested.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 23

Keywords: antitrust issues and policy; The Economics of Regulation; Intellectual property rights; Trade Policy

JEL Classification: L4, L51, G34, F130

working papers series


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Date posted: October 10, 2013  

Suggested Citation

Heimler, Alberto, Antitrust Enforcement and Regulation. Different Standards but Incentive Coherent? (October 3, 2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2335651 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2335651

Contact Information

Alberto Heimler (Contact Author)
Government of the Italian Republic (Italy) - National School of Administration ( email )
Via dei Robilant
11 - 00135 Rome
Italy
+3906 33565348 (Phone)
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