Directed Giving: Evidence from an Inter-Household Transfer Experiment

59 Pages Posted: 5 Oct 2013

See all articles by Catia Batista

Catia Batista

Nova School of Business and Economics; CReAM; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; NOVAFRICA

Dan Silverman

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Economics Department; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Dean Yang

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Department of Economics

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Abstract

We investigate the determinants of giving in a lab-in-the-field experiment with large stakes. Study participants in urban Mozambique play dictator games where their counterpart is the closest person to them outside their household. Dictators share more with counterparts when they have the option of giving in kind (in the form of goods), compared to giving that must be in cash. Qualitative post-experiment responses suggest that this effect is driven by a desire to control how recipients use gifted resources. Standard economic determinants such as the rate of return to giving and the size of the endowment also affect giving, but the effects of even large changes in these determinants are significantly smaller than the effect of the in-kind option. Our results support theories of giving where the utility of givers depends on the composition (not just the level) of gift-recipient expenditures, and givers thus seek control over transferred resources.

Keywords: sharing, altruism, giving, dictator game, inter-household transfers, Mozambique

JEL Classification: C92, C93, D01, D03, D64, O17

Suggested Citation

Batista, Catia and Silverman, Dan and Yang, Dean and Yang, Dean, Directed Giving: Evidence from an Inter-Household Transfer Experiment. IZA Discussion Paper No. 7629, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2336426 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2336426

Catia Batista (Contact Author)

Nova School of Business and Economics ( email )

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Dan Silverman

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Economics Department ( email )

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Dean Yang

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.umich.edu/~deanyang/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Department of Economics

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United States

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