Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2336672
 
 

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The Operational Consequences of Private Equity Buyouts: Evidence from the Restaurant Industry


Shai Bernstein


Stanford Graduate School of Business

Albert Sheen


University of Oregon - Department of Finance

December 8, 2013

Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 156

Abstract:     
Do private equity buyouts disrupt company operations to maximize short-term goals? We document significant operational changes in 103 restaurant chain buyouts between 2002 and 2012 using health inspection records for over 50,000 stores in Florida. Store-level operational practices improve after private equity buyout, as restaurants become cleaner, safer, and better maintained. Supporting a causal interpretation, this effect is stronger in chain-owned stores than in franchised locations -- “twin restaurants” over which private equity owners have limited control. Private equity targets also reduce employee headcount, lower menu prices, and experience a lower likelihood of store closures -- a proxy for poor financial performance. These changes to store-level operations require monitoring, training, and better alignment of worker incentives, suggesting PE firms improve management practices throughout the organization.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 49

Keywords: Private Equity, Management Practices, Operational Performance, Restaurant Industry, Franchisees

JEL Classification: G24, G34, J24, J28, M11, M54


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Date posted: October 8, 2013 ; Last revised: January 13, 2014

Suggested Citation

Bernstein, Shai and Sheen, Albert, The Operational Consequences of Private Equity Buyouts: Evidence from the Restaurant Industry (December 8, 2013). Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 156. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2336672 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2336672

Contact Information

Shai Bernstein (Contact Author)
Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )
655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States

Albert Sheen
University of Oregon - Department of Finance ( email )
Lundquist College of Business
1208 University of Oregon
Eugene, OR 97403
United States
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