Four Qualms About Legal Pragmatism

27 Pages Posted: 10 Oct 2013 Last revised: 26 Jan 2024

See all articles by Martin J. Stone

Martin J. Stone

Yeshiva University - Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law; New School for Social Research -- Philosophy

Date Written: October 8, 2013

Abstract

I try to explain why I find “legal pragmatism” mostly useless in thinking about law. My qualms about “legal pragmatism” fall under four headings: (1) Empty eclecticism, (2) reductive instrumentalism, (3) “the primacy of practice” and (4) the metaphysically preservative recoil. Originally a talk at the 2012 Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference, "Law and Pragmatism" Panel.

Keywords: legal pragmatism, Posner, instrumentalism, primacy of practice, Wittgenstein, interpretation, pragmatic conceptualism

Suggested Citation

Stone, Martin J., Four Qualms About Legal Pragmatism (October 8, 2013). Cardozo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 415 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2337600 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2337600

Martin J. Stone (Contact Author)

Yeshiva University - Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law ( email )

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New School for Social Research -- Philosophy ( email )

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