Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2338407
 
 

References (34)



 


 



The Effects of Remedies on Merger Activity in Oligopoly


Markus Dertwinkel-Kalt


Heinrich Heine Universität Dusseldorf - Duesseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

Christian Wey


University of Düsseldorf - Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

February 2014


Abstract:     
We analyze the effects of structural remedies on merger activity in a Cournot oligopoly when the antitrust agency applies a consumer surplus standard. Remedies increase the scope for profitable and acceptable mergers, while divestitures to an entrant firm are most effective in this regard. Concerning social welfare, it is most attractive when the merging parties can extract the asset sale's entire gains. Merging firms have strong incentives to search for the most efficient buyer. Under incomplete information, an efficient merger type is doomed to over-fix with its divestiture proposal in a pooling equilibrium, which is also possible under separation.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 43

Keywords: Remedies, Divestiture, Merger Control, Oligopoly, Synergies

JEL Classification: L13, L41, K21

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: October 11, 2013 ; Last revised: February 6, 2014

Suggested Citation

Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus and Wey, Christian, The Effects of Remedies on Merger Activity in Oligopoly (February 2014). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2338407 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2338407

Contact Information

Markus Dertwinkel-Kalt (Contact Author)
Heinrich Heine Universität Dusseldorf - Duesseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) ( email )
Universitaetsstr. 1
Duesseldorf, NRW 40225
Germany
Christian Wey
University of Düsseldorf - Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) ( email )
Universitaetsstr. 1
Duesseldorf, NRW 40225
Germany
+49-211-81-15009 (Phone)
+49-211-81-15499 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 142
Downloads: 41
References:  34

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.328 seconds