Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2338407
 
 

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Merger Remedies in Oligopoly under a Consumer Welfare Standard


Markus Dertwinkel-Kalt


Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf - Duesseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

Christian Wey


University of Düsseldorf - Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

April 2015


Abstract:     
We analyze the welfare effects of structural remedies on merger activity in a Cournot oligopoly when the antitrust agency applies a consumer surplus standard. We derive conditions such that otherwise price-increasing mergers become externality free by the use of remedial divestitures. In this case, the consumer surplus standard ensures that mergers are only implemented if they raise social welfare. If the merging parties can extract the entire surplus from the asset sale, then the socially optimal buyer will be selected under a consumer standard.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 36

Keywords: Remedies, Divestiture, Merger Control, Oligopoly, Synergies

JEL Classification: L13, L41, K21


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Date posted: October 11, 2013 ; Last revised: April 15, 2015

Suggested Citation

Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus and Wey, Christian, Merger Remedies in Oligopoly under a Consumer Welfare Standard (April 2015). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2338407 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2338407

Contact Information

Markus Dertwinkel-Kalt (Contact Author)
Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf - Duesseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) ( email )
Universitaetsstr. 1
Duesseldorf, NRW 40225
Germany
Christian Wey
University of Düsseldorf - Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) ( email )
Universitaetsstr. 1
Duesseldorf, NRW 40225
Germany
+49-211-81-15009 (Phone)
+49-211-81-15499 (Fax)
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