Preventing Government Shutdowns: Designing Default Rules for Budgets

David Gamage

University of California, Berkeley - Boalt Hall School of Law

David Louk

Yale Law School; Jurisprudence & Social Policy, UC Berkeley

May 11, 2014

University of Colorado Law Review, Forthcoming
UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 2339314

In nearly every area of law and governance, default policies exist when lawmakers cannot pass new legislation — typically, the status quo simply remains in effect. To its detriment, U.S. budget making at both the state and federal levels lacks effective defaults. If a new budget isn’t passed by year end, there is no budget. This lack of defaults, coupled with a dysfunctional era of budgetary politics, has led to a number of recent high-profile and costly state and federal government shutdowns.

To date, legal scholarship has failed to address both the causes and costs of government shutdowns and near-shutdowns, and thus has also failed to consider possible solutions to prevent them. This Article seeks to fill this gap, exploring the history and sources of recent government shutdowns. Government shutdowns are the result of a perfect storm of contemporary politics: acrimonious budget making characterized by partisan brinkmanship, game-of-chicken-style negotiation strategies, and strong anti-tax sentiment among many conservative legislators. Drawing on political science work on legislative negotiation theory, this Article explains how these new fiscal politics result in regular budget negotiation failures, greatly increasing the risk of costly government shutdowns or near-shutdowns.

From this diagnosis of budgetary dysfunction, this Article advocates for the adoption of default budget policies to maintain government operations in the event that legislators fail to pass a timely budget. This Article explains how default budget policies might be implemented to avert shutdowns and to stabilize the budget-making process. Drawing upon the experiences of several states with automatic continuing appropriations provisions, and the federal experience with sequestration, we explore how default budget policies might work in practice. Properly enacted, default budget policies have the potential to mitigate the harmful consequences of budget negotiation failures and to restore sanity to this era of new fiscal politics.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 77

Keywords: government shutdown, default budget, automatic continuing appropriations, fiscal politics, state budget, federal budget

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Date posted: October 13, 2013 ; Last revised: July 13, 2014

Suggested Citation

Gamage, David and Louk, David, Preventing Government Shutdowns: Designing Default Rules for Budgets (May 11, 2014). University of Colorado Law Review, Forthcoming; UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 2339314. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2339314 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2339314

Contact Information

David Gamage (Contact Author)
University of California, Berkeley - Boalt Hall School of Law ( email )
215 Boalt Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720-7200
United States
David Louk
Yale Law School ( email )
127 Wall St.
New Haven, CT 06511
United States
Jurisprudence & Social Policy, UC Berkeley ( email )
School of Law
University of California
Berkeley, CA 94720-2150
United States
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