Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2340754
 
 

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Corporate Takeovers and Economic Efficiency


B. Espen Eckbo


Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

October 15, 2013

ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 391/2013
Tuck School of Business Working Paper No. 2013-122

Abstract:     
I review recent takeover research which advances our understanding of "who buys who" in the drive for productive efficiency. This research provides detailed information on text-based definitions of product market links between bidders and targets, the role of the supply chain and industrial networks in driving takeovers, target plant efficiency, and pre- and post-takeover investment in product innovation. Moreover, recent evidence adds to our understanding of "how firms are sold" (transaction efficiency). Almost half of takeovers involving public targets are initiated by the seller and not by the buyer. Targets are strongly averse to bidder toeholds, and the merger negotiation process strongly protects proprietary information. Takeover premiums leave traces of rational bidding strategies, including bid preemption and winner’s curse avoidance. Recent tests employing exogenous instrumentation of bidder valuations reject that bidder shares are systematically overpriced in all-stock bids, and suggest that bidder synergy gains are much larger than previously thought.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 50

Keywords: Takeover, supply chain, innovation, bidding, deal terms, takeover gains

JEL Classification: G30, G34

working papers series


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Date posted: October 17, 2013 ; Last revised: December 4, 2013

Suggested Citation

Eckbo, B. Espen, Corporate Takeovers and Economic Efficiency (October 15, 2013). ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 391/2013; Tuck School of Business Working Paper No. 2013-122. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2340754 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2340754

Contact Information

B. Espen Eckbo (Contact Author)
Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business ( email )
Hanover, NH 03755
United States
603-646-3953 (Phone)
603-646-3805 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.tuck.dartmouth.edu/eckbo
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
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