Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2341453
 


 



Just Enough


Lee Anne Fennell


University of Chicago Law School

August 29, 2013

113 Columbia Law Review Sidebar 109 (2013)
University of Chicago Kreisman Working Papers Series in Housing Law and Policy No. 14
University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 659

Abstract:     
Does the constitutional measure of just compensation — fair market value — unfairly undercompensate those whose property is taken through eminent domain? Professor Brian Angelo Lee unpacks this inquiry in his recent article, Just Undercompensation: The Idiosyncratic Premium in Eminent Domain, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 593 (2013). In this response, I hope to both underscore the value of the questions Lee asks and challenge some of his answers. I start with the positive question of which elements, if any, are actually left out of the fair market value standard. I then turn to the normative question of whether failure to compensate for these elements should be regarded as unfair. I conclude that the fair market value standard does generally undercompensate condemnees in the ways that commentators have suggested, subject to some possible caveats. Nonetheless, the level of compensation that this standard provides when property is taken for public use may be just enough.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 18

Keywords: eminent domain, just compensation, subjective premium, uncompensated increment

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Date posted: October 17, 2013 ; Last revised: September 13, 2014

Suggested Citation

Fennell, Lee Anne, Just Enough (August 29, 2013). 113 Columbia Law Review Sidebar 109 (2013); University of Chicago Kreisman Working Papers Series in Housing Law and Policy No. 14; University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 659. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2341453

Contact Information

Lee Anne Fennell (Contact Author)
University of Chicago Law School ( email )
1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-0603 (Phone)
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