Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2343956
 


 



Voting Squared: Quadratic Voting in Democratic Politics


Eric A. Posner


University of Chicago - Law School

E. Glen Weyl


Microsoft Research New England; University of Chicago

February 14, 2014

Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol. 68, No. 2, 2015
University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 657

Abstract:     
Democratic institutions aggregate preferences poorly. The norm of one-person-one-vote with majority rule treats people fairly by giving everyone an equal chance to influence outcomes, but fails to give proportional weight to people whose interests in a social outcome are stronger than those of other people — a problem that leads to the familiar phenomenon of tyranny of the majority. Various institutions that have been tried or proposed over the years to correct this problem — including supermajority rule, weighted voting, cumulative voting, "mixed constitutions," executive discretion, and judicially protected rights — all badly misfire in various ways, for example, by creating gridlock or corruption. This paper proposes a new form of political decision-making based on the theory of quadratic voting. It explains how quadratic voting solves the preference aggregation problem, giving proper weight to preferences of varying intensity, and how it could be implemented as well as addressing concerns about its consequences for equity.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 58

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Date posted: October 24, 2013 ; Last revised: May 15, 2014

Suggested Citation

Posner, Eric A. and Weyl, E. Glen, Voting Squared: Quadratic Voting in Democratic Politics (February 14, 2014). Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol. 68, No. 2, 2015; University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 657. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2343956

Contact Information

Eric A. Posner (Contact Author)
University of Chicago - Law School ( email )
1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-0425 (Phone)
773-702-0730 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/posner-e/
Eric Glen Weyl
Microsoft Research New England ( email )
One Memorial Drive, 14th Floor
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
(857) 998-4513 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.glenweyl.com
University of Chicago ( email )
1126 East 59th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
(773) 702-4862 (Phone)
(773) 702-8490 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.glenweyl.com
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