Voting Squared: Quadratic Voting in Democratic Politics
Eric A. Posner
University of Chicago - Law School
E. Glen Weyl
University of Chicago; University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics
February 14, 2014
Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol. 68, No. 2, 2015
University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 657
Democratic institutions aggregate preferences poorly. The norm of one-person-one-vote with majority rule treats people fairly by giving everyone an equal chance to influence outcomes, but fails to give proportional weight to people whose interests in a social outcome are stronger than those of other people — a problem that leads to the familiar phenomenon of tyranny of the majority. Various institutions that have been tried or proposed over the years to correct this problem — including supermajority rule, weighted voting, cumulative voting, "mixed constitutions," executive discretion, and judicially protected rights — all badly misfire in various ways, for example, by creating gridlock or corruption. This paper proposes a new form of political decision-making based on the theory of quadratic voting. It explains how quadratic voting solves the preference aggregation problem, giving proper weight to preferences of varying intensity, and how it could be implemented as well as addressing concerns about its consequences for equity.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 58Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: October 24, 2013 ; Last revised: March 29, 2014
© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.500 seconds