Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2345983
 


 



The Evolution of U.S. Cartel Enforcement


Vivek Ghosal


Georgia Institute of Technology; Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research (CESifo)

D. Daniel Sokol


University of Florida - Levin College of Law; George Washington University Law School Competition Law Center

February 14, 2014

Journal of Law and Economics, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
Antitrust as a whole was transformed due in large part to the influential writings of Bork in The Antitrust Paradox (1978). This paper examines what Bork said and did not say about cartel enforcement and offers an examination of how actual the structure of cartel enforcement played out relative to what Bork advocated. To provide some perspective on Bork’s view of cartel enforcement, we compare his views to those of the other major influential antitrust book of the time by Posner (1976). We identify three distinctive stages of cartel enforcement. Stage one is characterized by low number of cartels prosecuted along with low fines and jail terms. Consistent with Bork’s vision, Stage two demonstrates a significant increase in cartels prosecuted, although fines and jail terms remain low. Stage three (the current stage) exemplifies a decline in the number of cartels prosecuted relative to stage two, but with dramatic increases in monetary fines and jail terms.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 19

Keywords: cartels, enforcement, prosecutions, antitrust, leniency, fines, jail terms

JEL Classification: K21, L41, L13, L11

Accepted Paper Series





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Date posted: March 23, 2014  

Suggested Citation

Ghosal, Vivek and Sokol, D. Daniel, The Evolution of U.S. Cartel Enforcement (February 14, 2014). Journal of Law and Economics, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2345983

Contact Information

Vivek Ghosal
Georgia Institute of Technology ( email )
School of Economics
221 Bobby Dodd Way
Atlanta, GA 30332
United States
404-894-4910 (Phone)
404-894-1890 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.gatech.edu/people/faculty/ghosal/
Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research (CESifo)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.cesifo.de
D. Daniel Sokol (Contact Author)
University of Florida - Levin College of Law ( email )
Spessard L. Holland Law Center
P.O. Box 117625
Gainesville, FL 32611-7625
United States
(352) 273-0968 (Phone)
(352) 392-3005 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.ufl.edu/faculty/d-daniel-sokol
George Washington University Law School Competition Law Center ( email )
200 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20052
United States
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