The Evolution of U.S. Cartel Enforcement
Georgia Institute of Technology; Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research (CESifo)
D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida - Levin College of Law; George Washington University Law School Competition Law Center
February 14, 2014
Journal of Law and Economics, Forthcoming
Antitrust as a whole was transformed due in large part to the influential writings of Bork in The Antitrust Paradox (1978). This paper examines what Bork said and did not say about cartel enforcement and offers an examination of how actual the structure of cartel enforcement played out relative to what Bork advocated. To provide some perspective on Bork’s view of cartel enforcement, we compare his views to those of the other major influential antitrust book of the time by Posner (1976). We identify three distinctive stages of cartel enforcement. Stage one is characterized by low number of cartels prosecuted along with low fines and jail terms. Consistent with Bork’s vision, Stage two demonstrates a significant increase in cartels prosecuted, although fines and jail terms remain low. Stage three (the current stage) exemplifies a decline in the number of cartels prosecuted relative to stage two, but with dramatic increases in monetary fines and jail terms.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 19
Keywords: cartels, enforcement, prosecutions, antitrust, leniency, fines, jail terms
JEL Classification: K21, L41, L13, L11Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: March 23, 2014
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