Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2346676
 


 



The Costs of Separation: Friction between Company and Insolvency Law in the Single Market


Carsten Gerner-Beuerle


London School of Economics and Political Science

Edmund‐Philipp Schuster


London School of Economics - Law Department

February 10, 2014

LSE Legal Studies Working Paper No. 6/2014

Abstract:     
Corporate mobility and choice of law within the EU has dominated much of the academic writing in European company law over the last decades. What has not yet received much attention is the way in which national company law interacts with and depends on features of the national legal system outside of company law. In this article we explore this interaction and its relevance for coherent national regulatory systems.

Using the regulatory framework for companies in the ‘vicinity of insolvency’ as an example, we show how choice of company law can create both regulatory gaps and multiplication of legal requirements, as private international law rules are applied inconsistently across Europe. More importantly, however, we show that even consistent application of conflicts rules would fail to resolve these problems due to cross-doctrinal interdependence within any national legal system.

We conclude that this is a design flaw in the way EU law deals with the increasingly international reach of corporations, and discuss possible paths for resolving or mitigating this issue.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 44

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Date posted: February 13, 2014 ; Last revised: February 15, 2014

Suggested Citation

Gerner-Beuerle, Carsten and Schuster, Edmund‐Philipp, The Costs of Separation: Friction between Company and Insolvency Law in the Single Market (February 10, 2014). LSE Legal Studies Working Paper No. 6/2014. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2346676 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2346676

Contact Information

Carsten Gerner-Beuerle (Contact Author)
London School of Economics and Political Science ( email )
Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

Edmund-Philipp Schuster
London School of Economics - Law Department ( email )
Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

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