The Costs of Separation: Friction between Company and Insolvency Law in the Single Market
London School of Economics and Political Science
London School of Economics - Law Department
February 10, 2014
LSE Legal Studies Working Paper No. 6/2014
Corporate mobility and choice of law within the EU has dominated much of the academic writing in European company law over the last decades. What has not yet received much attention is the way in which national company law interacts with and depends on features of the national legal system outside of company law. In this article we explore this interaction and its relevance for coherent national regulatory systems.
Using the regulatory framework for companies in the ‘vicinity of insolvency’ as an example, we show how choice of company law can create both regulatory gaps and multiplication of legal requirements, as private international law rules are applied inconsistently across Europe. More importantly, however, we show that even consistent application of conflicts rules would fail to resolve these problems due to cross-doctrinal interdependence within any national legal system.
We conclude that this is a design flaw in the way EU law deals with the increasingly international reach of corporations, and discuss possible paths for resolving or mitigating this issue.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 44
Date posted: February 13, 2014 ; Last revised: February 15, 2014
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