Dual Ownership, Returns, and Voting in Mergers
University of Notre Dame - Mendoza College of Business
Texas A&M; University of Notre Dame - Department of Finance
January 24, 2014
Finance Down Under 2014 Building on the Best from the Cellars of Finance
We document that in M&As a significant proportion of targets’ equity is owned by financial institutions that simultaneously own targets’ bonds (“dual holders”). Targets with larger equity ownership by dual holders have lower M&A equity premia and larger abnormal bond returns, particularly when dual holders stand to benefit more from appreciation of their bond stakes, e.g., when their bond ownership in the target is large and the target credit rating is non-investment grade. Dual holders are more likely to vote in favor of the merger proposal. Our results suggest the presence of coordination of decisions within dual holding financial conglomerates in M&A targets.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 42
Keywords: dual holders, shareholders, bondholders, M&As, abnormal return, financial conglomerates
JEL Classification: G23, G32, G34
Date posted: February 12, 2014 ; Last revised: February 13, 2014
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