Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2351809
 


 



Patent Value and Citations: Creative Destruction or Strategic Disruption?


David Abrams


University of Pennsylvania Law School

Ufuk Akcigit


University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Jillian A. Popadak


Duke University - Fuqua School of Business

November 5, 2013

PIER Working Paper No. 13-065
U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 13-23

Abstract:     
Prior work suggests that more valuable patents are cited more and this view has become standard in the empirical innovation literature. Using an NPE-derived dataset with patent-specific revenues we find that the relationship of citations to value in fact forms an inverted-U, with fewer citations at the high end of value than in the middle. Since the value of patents is concentrated in those at the high end, this is a challenge to both the empirical literature and the intuition behind it. We attempt to explain this relationship with a simple model of innovation, allowing for both productive and strategic patents. We find evidence of greater use of strategic patents where it would be most expected: among corporations, in fields of rapid development, in more recent patents and where divisional and continuation applications are employed. These findings have important implications for our basic understanding of growth, innovation, and intellectual property policy.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 43

Keywords: productive innovation, defensive innovation, patents, creative destruction, citations, patent value, competition, intellectual property, entrepreneurship, strategic patenting, defensive patenting, patent thickets, fencing patents

JEL Classification: O3, L2, K1

working papers series





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Date posted: November 8, 2013 ; Last revised: August 6, 2014

Suggested Citation

Abrams, David and Akcigit, Ufuk and Popadak, Jillian A., Patent Value and Citations: Creative Destruction or Strategic Disruption? (November 5, 2013). PIER Working Paper No. 13-065; U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 13-23. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2351809 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2351809

Contact Information

David S. Abrams
University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )
3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
Ufuk Akcigit (Contact Author)
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )
160 McNeil Building
3718 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.sas.upenn.edu/~uakcigit/web/Home.html
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Jillian A. Popadak
Duke University - Fuqua School of Business ( email )
Box 90120
Durham, NC 27708-0120
United States
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