The Administrative State's Passive Virtues

Sharon Jacobs

University of Colorado Law School

November 17, 2013

Administrative Law Review, Vol. 66, 2014

Fifty years ago, Alexander Bickel famously suggested that courts use tools like standing, ripeness and the political question doctrine to avoid reaching the merits of difficult cases. Yet despite the increasingly central role of administrative agencies in government, there have been no efforts to date to apply Bickel’s insights to the bureaucracy. This article remedies that deficit. The article provides a three-part taxonomy of administrative restraint and offers case studies from federal agencies including the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency and the Fish and Wildlife Service. It argues that agencies use restraint strategically for reasons similar to Bickelian courts: to avoid unnecessary conflict with other institutional actors. Moreover, like the passive virtues in the judicial arena, agency passivity is often normatively desirable and should be facilitated rather than undermined by reviewing courts.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 59

Open PDF in Browser Download This Paper

Date posted: November 18, 2013 ; Last revised: May 15, 2015

Suggested Citation

Jacobs, Sharon, The Administrative State's Passive Virtues (November 17, 2013). Administrative Law Review, Vol. 66, 2014. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2355988

Contact Information

Sharon Jacobs (Contact Author)
University of Colorado Law School ( email )
401 UCB
Wolf Law Building
Boulder, CO 80309
United States
Feedback to SSRN

Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 767
Downloads: 156
Download Rank: 128,934

© 2015 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo1 in 0.579 seconds