Malicious Prosecution Claims in Section 1983 Lawsuits
Lyle David Kossis
Quinn Emanuel Urquhart Oliver & Hedges, LLP; University of Virginia - School of Law, Alumnus or Degree Candidate Author
October 10, 2013
99 Virginia Law Review 1635 (2013)
There is little certainty among the federal courts as to how the tort of malicious prosecution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 interact. In Albright v. Oliver, the Supreme Court suggested that the Fourth Amendment was the proper vehicle for analyzing malicious prosecution claims in Section 1983 actions. But the continuing confusion among the lower courts is some evidence that the Court’s answer was unsatisfactory. This Note hopes to provide some clarity to this muddied area of the law and explain why the Court’s decision in Albright was wrong. Part I surveys the history of malicious prosecution and Section 1983, as well as the Supreme Court’s opinion in Albright and the subsequent circuit split among the Courts of Appeals. Part II then proceeds to explain why the Court’s decision to use the Fourth Amendment to incorporate malicious prosecution made little sense, and why the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments provide better alternatives. It also examines the implications of using the different amendments, and whether it matters if these questions are resolved by federal courts. Finally, Part III analyzes two distinct claims made in the literature which rest on the premise that Albright was correct, and explains why there are critical flaws in each of these arguments.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 37
Keywords: Section 1983; Albright; malicious prosecutionAccepted Paper Series
Date posted: November 21, 2013
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