Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2360274
 


 



The Role of the IMF in Future Sovereign Debt Restructurings


Douglas G. Baird


University of Chicago Law School

Nicole Bollen


Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Netherlands

Lee C. Buchheit


Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP - New York Office

G. Mitu Gulati


Duke University - School of Law

Anne O. Krueger


Johns Hopkins University

Fridrik Mar Baldursson


Reykjavik University

Robert K. Rasmussen


USC Gould School of Law

David A. Skeel Jr.


University of Pennsylvania Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Sergei Storchak


Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation

Jeromin Zettelmeyer


European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; CEPR; Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics

December 10, 2013

USC CLASS Research Paper No. CLASS 13-6
USC Law Legal Studies Paper No. 13-19

Abstract:     
A meeting of international finance and insolvency experts was held on November 2, 2013 at the Annenberg House in Santa Monica, California. The meeting was co-hosted by the USC Law School and the Annenberg Retreat at Sunnylands. The goal was to solicit the views of experts on the implications of the IMF’s April 26, 2013 paper captioned “Sovereign Debt Restructuring -- Recent Developments and Implications for the Fund’s Legal and Policy Framework”. The April 26 paper may signal a shift in IMF policies in the area of sovereign debt workouts. Although the Expert Group discussed a number of the ideas contained in the April 26 paper, attention focused on paragraph 32 of that paper. That paragraph states in relevant part:

“There may be a case for exploring additional ways to limit the risk that Fund resources will simply be used to bail out private creditors. For example, a presumption could be established that some form of a creditor bail-in measure would be implemented as a condition for Fund lending in cases where, although no clear-cut determination has been made that the debt is unsustainable, the member has lost market access and prospects for regaining market access are uncertain.”

This Report summarizes the consensus views of the Expert Group on the practical implications of the suggestions contained in paragraph 32 of the April 26 paper.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 15

Keywords: International Monetary Fund, Sovereign Debt

JEL Classification: F3

Accepted Paper Series


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Date posted: November 26, 2013 ; Last revised: December 11, 2013

Suggested Citation

Baird, Douglas G. and Bollen, Nicole and Buchheit, Lee C. and Gulati, G. Mitu and Krueger, Anne O. and Baldursson, Fridrik Mar and Rasmussen, Robert K. and Skeel, David A. and Storchak, Sergei and Zettelmeyer, Jeromin, The Role of the IMF in Future Sovereign Debt Restructurings (December 10, 2013). USC CLASS Research Paper No. CLASS 13-6; USC Law Legal Studies Paper No. 13-19. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2360274 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2360274

Contact Information

Douglas G. Baird
University of Chicago Law School ( email )
1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-9571 (Phone)
773-702-0730 (Fax)
Nicole Bollen
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Netherlands ( email )
Bezuidenhoutseweg 67
PO Box 20061
Hague, 2500
Netherlands
Lee C. Buchheit
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP - New York Office ( email )
One Liberty Plaza
New York, NY 10006-1470
United States
Gaurang Mitu Gulati (Contact Author)
Duke University - School of Law ( email )
Box 90360
Duke School of Law
Durham, NC 27708
United States
Anne O. Krueger
Johns Hopkins University ( email )
Fridrik Mar Baldursson
Reykjavik University ( email )
Menntavegur 1
Reykjavik, 101
Iceland
354-8256396 (Phone)
354-5996201 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.ru.is/starfsfolk/fmb
Robert K. Rasmussen
USC Gould School of Law ( email )
699 Exposition Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90089-0071
United States
213-740-6473 (Phone)
213-740-5502 (Fax)

David A. Skeel Jr.
University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )
3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-573-9859 (Phone)
215-573-2025 (Fax)
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
Sergei Storchak
Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation ( email )
Moscow
Russia
Jeromin Zettelmeyer
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development ( email )
One Exchange Square
London, EC2A 2JN
United Kingdom
+442073386178 (Phone)
+442073386110 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/economics/researchers.shtml#jeromin
CEPR ( email )
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics ( email )
1750 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
United States
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