The Determinants of Board Structure at the Initial Public Offering
Malcolm P. Baker
Harvard Business School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Paul A. Gompers
Harvard Business School - Finance Unit; Harvard University - Entrepreneurial Management Unit; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
This paper describes board size and composition and investigates the role of venture capital in a sample of 1,116 IPO firms. First, venture capital-backed firms have fewer insider and instrumental directors and more independent outsiders. Second, we consider board composition as the outcome of a bargain between the CEO and outside shareholders. Representation of independent outsiders on the board decreases with the power of the CEO - tenure and voting control - and increases with the power of outside investors - venture capital backing and venture firm reputation. Third, within the sample of venture financed firms and also consistent with a bargaining model, the probability that a founder remains as CEO is decreasing in venture firm reputation. Finally, we examine the influence of venture capital backing and board structure on firm outcomes in the ten years after the IPO.
Note: Previously titled: The Determinants of Board Structure and Function in Entrepreneurial Firms
Number of Pages in PDF File: 43
JEL Classification: G24, G30working papers series
Date posted: July 24, 2000 ; Last revised: January 22, 2009
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