Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=236106
 
 

References (31)



 
 

Citations (22)



 


 



Hospital Governance, Performance Objectives, and Organizational Form


Leslie Eldenburg


University of Arizona

Benjamin E. Hermalin


University of California, Berkeley

Michael S. Weisbach


Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Marta Wosinska


Harvard Business School

June 2000

Presented at Tuck-JFE Contemporary Corporate Governance Conference

Abstract:     
This paper studies the governance of a sample of California hospitals. We document a number of empirical relations about hospital governance: The composition of the board of directors varies systematically across ownership types; poor performance and high administrative costs increase board turnover, with this sensitivity varying by organizational type; and poor performance, high administrative costs, and high uncompensated care lead to higher CEO turnover, with these effects again varying across different organizational types. Overall, these results are consistent with the view that boards of directors of hospitals of different organizational forms are substantially different, and that these boards make decisions to maximize different objective functions.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 35

Keywords: board structure, corporate governance

JEL Classification: G34, I12

working papers series


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Date posted: July 25, 2000  

Suggested Citation

Eldenburg, Leslie and Hermalin, Benjamin E. and Weisbach, Michael S. and Wosinska, Marta, Hospital Governance, Performance Objectives, and Organizational Form (June 2000). Presented at Tuck-JFE Contemporary Corporate Governance Conference. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=236106 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.236106

Contact Information

Leslie G. Eldenburg
University of Arizona ( email )
McClelland Hall Room 301H
Tucson, AZ 85721
United States
520-621-4585 (Phone)
520-621-3742 (Fax)
Benjamin E. Hermalin
University of California, Berkeley ( email )
545 Student Services Building
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
510-642-7575 (Phone)
510-643-1420 (Fax)
Michael S. Weisbach (Contact Author)
Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Finance ( email )
2100 Neil Avenue
Columbus, OH 43210-1144
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Marta Wosinska
Harvard Business School ( email )
Soldiers Field
Boston, MA 02163
United States
617-495-6548 (Phone)
617-496-5853 (Fax)
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