Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=236488
 


 



Independent Mistakes In Large Games


Ady Pauzner


Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics


International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 29, No. 2

Abstract:     
Economic models usually assume that agents play precise best responses to others' actions. It is sometimes argued that this is a good approximation when there are many agents in the game, because if their mistakes are independent, aggregate uncertainty is small. We study a class of games in which players' payoffs depend solely on their individual actions and on the aggregate of all players' actions. We investigate whether their equilibria are affected by mistakes when the number of players becomes large. Indeed, in generic games with continuous payoff functions, independent mistakes wash out in the limit. This may not be the case if payoffs are discontinuous. As a counter-example we present the n players Nash bargaining game, as well as a large class of "free-rider games".

Key words: Large games ? independent mistakes ? trembles ? free rider

JEL Classification: C70, C78

Accepted Paper Series





Not Available For Download

Date posted: January 22, 2001  

Suggested Citation

Pauzner, Ady, Independent Mistakes In Large Games. International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 29, No. 2. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=236488

Contact Information

Ady Pauzner (Contact Author)
Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics ( email )
P.O. Box 39040
Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978
Israel
972-3-640-9297 (Phone)
972-3-640-9908 (Fax)
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