Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2365586
 


 



The Behavior of Federal Judges: A View from the D.C. Circuit


Douglas H. Ginsburg


George Mason University School of Law

December 9, 2013

Judicature, Vol. 97, No. 2, p. 109, September/October 2013
George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 13-70

Abstract:     
In their book The Behavior of Federal Judges, Professors Lee Epstein and William Landes and Judge Richard Posner offer many insights into the workings of the federal judiciary. Two of their findings, however, strike me as curious: (1) A high rate of dissent in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, and (2) a significant ideological influence upon decisions of the courts of appeals generally. In this brief essay, I examine these findings based upon limited quantitative evidence and some direct observations drawn from 27 years of service on the D.C. Circuit.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 15

Keywords: administrative, agency, anecdotal, book review, collegiality, conference, cost-benefit analysis, court size, ideology, judicial decisionmaking, Professor William Jordan, rational choice, regulation

JEL Classification: K40

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Date posted: December 11, 2013  

Suggested Citation

Ginsburg, Douglas H., The Behavior of Federal Judges: A View from the D.C. Circuit (December 9, 2013). Judicature, Vol. 97, No. 2, p. 109, September/October 2013; George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 13-70. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2365586

Contact Information

Douglas H. Ginsburg (Contact Author)
George Mason University School of Law ( email )
3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

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