Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises: An Empirical Survey of the Model of Temasek Holdings in Singapore

Singapore Management University School of Law Research Paper No. 6/2014

21st Century Commercial Law Forum: 13th International Symposium 2013, pp. 1-29, 2013

29 Pages Posted: 12 Dec 2013 Last revised: 13 Feb 2014

See all articles by Christopher C. Chen

Christopher C. Chen

National Taiwan University - College of Law

Date Written: September 30, 2013

Abstract

This paper explores the effect of Temasek Holdings Pte Ltd, one of Singapore’s two prominent sovereign wealth funds, on the corporate governance of its target companies in Singapore. It compares companies associated with Temasek with the other listed companies on the Singapore Exchange that form the components of the Straits Times Index. Based on these companies’ 2012 annual reports, this paper finds that the companies in which Temasek has direct stakes have a higher proportion of independent directors and are more likely to have an independent director serving as chairman, indicating a higher quality of corporate governance. However, Temasek’s success is not necessarily a result of law, but may have more to do with its self-disciplinary nature and the hands-off approach of the Singaporean government. This means that the Temasek model may not easily be copied by state-owned enterprises in other countries. However, the fact that Temasek plays like an active investor and complies with corporate law may prove that state-owned enterprises may still enjoy a higher quality of corporate governance, and that sovereign wealth funds may behave akin to responsible investors.

Keywords: Temasek Holdings, state-owned enterprises, corporate governance, Singapore

JEL Classification: K22

Suggested Citation

Chen, Christopher Chao-hung, Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises: An Empirical Survey of the Model of Temasek Holdings in Singapore (September 30, 2013). Singapore Management University School of Law Research Paper No. 6/2014, 21st Century Commercial Law Forum: 13th International Symposium 2013, pp. 1-29, 2013 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2366699 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2366699

Christopher Chao-hung Chen (Contact Author)

National Taiwan University - College of Law ( email )

No.1, Sec.4, Roosevelt Road
Taipei, 10617, 10617
Taiwan

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