Bork's Strategy, Price Fixing, and the Influence of the Chicago School on Modern Antitrust Law
George L. Priest
Yale University - Law School
December 11, 2013
Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 487
This paper addresses why Robert Bork’s The Antitrust Paradox appears to have had such influence on the Supreme Court, leading the Court to largely adopt the Chicago School analysis of antitrust issues. It attributes this influence to Bork’s endorsement of the per se prohibition of price fixing — not embraced by others of the Chicago School — which Bork claimed required the Court to rethink its treatment of vertical restraints. The paper also attributes the influence to Bork’s emphasis on neutral principles for judicial decisionmaking, to Bork’s service as Solicitor General, to the delayed publication of his book until after that service, and to the appointment of John Paul Stevens to the Court. Though it has not been generally publicized, Stevens, like Bork, was heavily influenced by Aaron Director and was well aware of the many economic criticisms of Court antitrust opinions published in this Journal.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 27Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: December 18, 2013 ; Last revised: February 18, 2014
© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo2 in 0.500 seconds